Are you falling into the "Numbers Trap" in functional safety? Many practitioners mistakenly assume that meeting a PFDavg or PFH target automatically guarantees SIL compliance. However, a truly safe and compliant Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) requires much more than just a passing mathematical probability.
In this webinar, Steve Gandy breaks down the three mandatory performance criteria mandated by IEC 61511 and IEC 61508. He explores why the SIL achieved is only as strong as its weakest link, and how ignoring structural rules can lead to over-designed capital expenses or dangerous, hidden operational risks. Learn how to move beyond simple calculations toward a holistic, compliant, and defensible safety lifecycle!
Key Discussion Points
Have you ever heard people say, “I’ve met the PFDavg target, so I’ve met my SIL target?” It’s true that in low demand we need to meet the PFDavg (or PFH for High/Continuous mode) requirement for the Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) but this is just one of three requirements to…
The course is structured around the operational and maintenance aspects of alarm systems. It begins with an introduction to Alarm Management, covering key concept. such as alarm rationalization, basic alarm design, HMI design, dynamic alarming, and designed alarm suppression. The course then delves deeply into operational and maintenance tasks, including…
Practical SIL Target Selection - Risk Analysis per the IEC 61511 Safety Lifecycle is now back in stock and available for purchase through the exida online store ! This book is a must read for Process Safety Engineers, PHA and LOPA facilitators, and anybody active in the Analysis phase of…
This video reviews the different modules of the OEMx tool talking about the key capabilities of each and how they fit into the Development process.
IEC 62443, ISASecure in the Security Automation Equipment List
Introduction Under the EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) , product classification drives the compliance path—including the depth of required evidence and whether conformity can be supplier-led or requires third-party involvement. This post explains why programmable logic controllers (PLCs) used in operational technology (OT) environments are generally not “ Hardware Security…
Overview: In process safety, many engineers default to the "worst-case" event as their sole design basis for a SIF during Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA). While this feels conservative, analyzing initiating events in isolation often ignores significant residual risk. If your LOPA doesn't account for the summation of all initiating events, you are likely underestimating your demand frequency—and potentially your required Safety Integrity Level (SIL).
In this webinar, Alejandro Esparza dives into how to handle multiple initiating events in LOPA. We will demonstrate how a "worst-case" analysis can miss up to 20% of the actual risk profile, leading to under-designed safety systems and inadequate testing intervals.
Key Takeaways:
Who Will Benefit? Process Safety Engineers, Control Systems Engineers, SIS Specialists, and Operations Managers responsible for IEC 61511 compliance and risk reduction.
Sometimes, the goal isn't a complex safety certification; it's a fast, accurate snapshot of product reliability. This video demonstrates a streamlined workflow within OEMx designed for engineers who need high-level reliability data fast.
Instead of painstakingly categorizing every failure mode into (safe vs dangerous, detected vs undetected), we show you how to simply include or exclude failures to reach your Total Failure Rate. You get the benefit of the world’s most comprehensive component database and automated failure data loading, allowing you to finish your analysis in a fraction of the time.
Key Takeaway: "Quick and Easy" doesn't mean "Inaccurate." By using the right tools (FMEDAx and exida Component Reliability Database), you can simplify the process without compromising the data.
Duration: 10:02
Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) design is based on performance requirements. During design, assumptions concerning SIF equipment failure rates, SIF demand rates, proof test frequencies, mission time are made. These form the basis for the expected performance.
Are those assumptions realistic? Is the SIF really operating as assumed?
IEC 61511 expects users to periodically compare actual performance with assumed performance. How do we do that? What is needed to get statistically viable results from the collected data? How does the data apply? How do we make sure we avoid drawing unrealistic conclusions?
This presentation will look at answers to these questions.
Presented at the Hazards35 Process Safety Conference in Birmingham, UK (Nov 2025).
This video provides a comprehensive overview of exida’s SILstat software. SIL stat helps with the operation and maintenance phase of the functional safety lifecycle. It can be used to track the performance of your safety system and to validate assumptions made during the analysis and design phase of your safety instrumented system.
ISO 26262 in the Safety Automation Equipment List
ISO 26262 in the Safety Automation Equipment List
As the cybersecurity landscape continually evolves, engineers here at exida are working with organizations looking to achieve and maintain cybersecurity compliance. Tools like exSILentia® Cyber help end users comply with the standards and improve the traceability and documentation of cybersecurity tasks throughout their company. exSILentia Cyber is a great tool…
SELLERSVILLE, PA – March 25, 2026 – exida, the global leader in functional safety and cybersecurity certification, is pleased to announce the release of its latest technical whitepaper: “Qualification and Certification of Open-Source Software.” This landmark document addresses the growing necessity of integrating Open-Source Software (OSS) into safety-critical industrial and…
As Open-Source Software (OSS) becomes essential for high-complexity, safety-critical applications , the industry must bridge the gap between transparent OSS development and traditional, rigid “V-model” safety standards. This whitepaper provides a roadmap for users, maintainers, and integrators to successfully qualify OSS Linux and GNU/Linux projects up to SIL 2 /…
Considering a Cyber Risk Assessment and don’t know where to start - well we have news for you!
We gathered feedback from both our customers and our own Engineering teams on usability improvements and features, and our software team has delivered!
Allow us to introduce our new revision of exSILentia Cyber with new dedicated HLRA (High Level Risk Assessment) and DLRA (Detailed Level Risk Assessment) worksheets. This new structure follows the IEC 62443-3-2 OT Cyber Risk methodology where an initial Cyber Risk Assessment (HLRA) can first be carried out, followed by a DLRA. Data gathered during the HLRA can be easily brought into the DLRA using smart linking functionality.
We have added many features including:
HLRA:
DLRA:
For both HLRA and DLRA, you can now set a default likelihood during risk setup, which allows each new iteration to be set with an initial likelihood. This can of course be changed after as required.
Join Dwane Shelton as he walks us through a live example of both a High and Detailed level Risk Assessment using our new release of exSILentia Cyber
IEC 62443-4-1 in the Security Automation Equipment List
When designing a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF), practitioners often encounter a complex scenario: multiple initiating events (independent causes) leading to the same hazardous consequence. While common industry practice is to design for the “worst-case” scenario in isolation, this approach contains a hidden danger. A groundbreaking whitepaper from exida reveals why…
The “Swiss Cheese” model is a visual way of demonstrating what happens to a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) and other Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) when not following the IEC61511 lifecycle and/or RAGAGEP (Recognized And Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices) for the maintenance and mechanical integrity requirements. The “holes” in the Cheese represent a degradation of the SIS and iPLs created by random or systematic faults. These failures result in the “holes” appearing in our model and when all the “holes” line up, this is when the SIS and other protection layers fail to perform their risk reduction task resulting in an incident. This can then lead to severe consequences in terms of explosions, fires, toxic releases, etc.
The webinar ties in the Swiss Cheese model approach to the proper operation and maintenance requirements for the SIS and IPLs, which includes site culture, practices and competency.
What you will learn
Who should attend