IEC 61508 in the Safety Automation Equipment List
An article on complying with IEC 61511 Operation and Maintenance Requirements written by exida's Dr. Steve Gandy can now be found in the May 2021 issue of Intech Focus. This edition of InTech Focus understands that digitalization and innovation are transforming process control and process safety, and how automation professionals…
ISO 26262 in the Safety Automation Equipment List
ISASecure in the Security Automation Equipment List
IEC 61508 in the Safety Automation Equipment List
IEC 61508 in the Safety Automation Equipment List
IEC 61508, ISO 13849 in the Safety Automation Equipment List
Many industrial processes operate in Batch mode, i.e., a process where only limited quantity of product is generated at a time. The on/off behavior of a batch process provides unique opportunities to more frequently test SIF equipment. But how doe you take this into consideration in SIL verification? What is the probability of failure when the process if not running? exSILentia 4.11 introduced the ability to model batch processes directly within the SILver module. This webinar will look at aspects to consider when accounting for batch operation in SIL verification. The webinar will also review some more challenging batch operation scenarios and wasy to evaluate those in more detail.
It’s interesting that I had been preparing a webinar on pipeline safety and security since there have already been numerous incidents reported regarding pipeline accidents and leakage. Now the latest incident concerning Colonial Pipeline and the ransomware attack by Darkside, a so-called extortion group, believed to be operating out of…
Many organizations have mature processes in place for evaluating process or machinery hazards in traditional safety risk assessments, but fewer have developed a robust approach to cybersecurity risk assessment. Alignment between safety risk assessment and cybersecurity risk assessment is critical, and the 2016 version of IEC 61511 now requires that a cybersecurity risk assessment be conducted for all Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) and connected systems. Fortunately, traditional process hazard analyses (PHAs) have valuable information that can be used to improve the speed and efficiency of the cybersecurity assessment, including corporate risk criteria, potential consequences resulting from control system failures, severity rankings for consequence scenarios, existing mechanical protection layers. With this information organizations can jumpstart their approach to managing cybersecurity risk.
IEC 61508 in the Safety Automation Equipment List
IEC 61508 in the Safety Automation Equipment List
IEC 61508 in the Safety Automation Equipment List
One of the most common and preventable contributors to industrial incidents is an operator failing to respond to an alarm, often resulting directly or indirectly from the presence of nuisance alarms. Nuisance alarms are like the boy who cried wolf. They are meaningless and annoying until they are not. They…
exida helps a chemical producer close gaps in functional safety design and implementation before hazards are introduced to the process. The Iowa Fertilizer Company (IFCo) facility in Weaver, IA is a world-scale greenfield fertilizer plant with a capacity of up to 3 million metric tons of nitrogen fertilizers. Contracted by…
IEC 61508 in the Safety Automation Equipment List
IEC 61508 in the Safety Automation Equipment List
No, you probably don’t want to hurt me. But if your product is used in a safety application, and my job depends on your product doing its job, will it hurt me if it fails? With so many of us doing more things differently during the COVID pandemic, I wonder…
One year on, Shannon’s First Virtual Foreign Direct Investment sign-up, exida, is making strides in the European market Browsing through exida’s corporate profile, it is easy to see why this company has become one of the world’s leading product certification and knowledge companies, specialising in automation system safety, alarm management…
According to numerous industry studies, significant improvement has been made over the last 20 -30 years in occupational safety, but not so much in operational safety (process safety). New process safety incidents continue to occur that bear a striking resemblance to previous incidents. This means we are not effectively learning…